Editorial It isn't polling Bias when it is partisan.

Polling should always be close to votes. And it has been, since 1952, when the GOP candidate is poor. But, inexcusably off in some circumstances. For example the 1952 Eisenhower win was over 55%, but the poll had it at 51%. There is no excuse for competent pollsters to be that wrong. Pollsters overcorrected for the second term of Eisenhower in 1956. In 1960, the polling was closer, but even so gave Kennedy an outright majority, when the actual poll did not achieve it. Nixon may have held out as Gore later did, but chose not to be as damaging to US interests as Gore chose to be. In 1964, Goldwater was under sold by 2.5%. In 1980, Reagan was undersold by 3.7%. Trump is under sold in 2016 and 2024. But the disputed 2020 results are interesting. Not because Trump was not undersold, but because Biden was not oversold. The one time it looks like there was cheating, the polls were on point. Is it true that Biden was more popular than Obama? What explains that? Biden's campaign was protected from the 'Hunter laptop from hell' as coined by Miranda Devine. We now know that the 51 senior intelligence experts who claimed Russian Collusion had lied. Would such sleaze really make Biden more popular than Obama? Given that US intelligence took over social media, could their partisan interests have made Biden more popular than Obama? Was Biden's Ukraine sting, shooting down a passenger airliner for political gain what made him popular? It is not bias, suggesting an unconcious leaning. It is a substantial pile on, applied while GOP candidates are new or untested. And it is one sided. Often there is a goal in mind. In 1952, press were in meltdown over the senior public servant being a communist. In 1980, Reagan was a known threat to status quo over foreign affairs. But the most obvious question regards Obama. What made him popular? Was Obama an ISI plant?

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Grok replies

Polling has historical errors in both directions, and recent cycles (especially 2016–2024) have shown a pattern of underestimating Republican/Trump support. That pattern is real and documented. Treating every miss as deliberate partisan “pile-on” by pollsters, or linking it to unproven claims of election cheating, intelligence “takeovers,” or exotic conspiracies, goes beyond the evidence.

Historical poll performance (Gallup final estimates vs. results)

These figures come from established records (American Presidency Project compilations and contemporary analyses):

• 1952: Final Gallup roughly Eisenhower 51% / Stevenson 49%. Actual: Eisenhower ~55.1%. Underestimated the winner by ~4 points. Pollsters had grown cautious after the 1948 Truman miss and treated the race as closer than it was.
• 1956: Gallup ~Eisenhower 59.5%. Actual ~57.4%. Mild overestimate of the incumbent.
• 1960: Gallup ~Kennedy 51% / Nixon 49%. Actual popular vote essentially tied (Kennedy ~49.7%). Slight overestimate of Kennedy’s share.
• 1964: Gallup ~Johnson 64% / Goldwater 36%. Actual Johnson ~61.1% / Goldwater ~38.5%. Goldwater understated by roughly 2.5 points.
• 1980: Late Gallup ~Reagan 47% / Carter 44% (with Anderson). Actual Reagan ~50.7%. Underestimated Reagan by ~3.7 points; late surge and third-party dynamics contributed.

Polls have missed landslides, close races, and late shifts for decades. Errors are not unique to one party. Pre-2016 history shows misses both ways; the last three presidential cycles have repeatedly understated Republican support (education weighting, non-response among certain demographics, and social-desirability effects are the leading technical explanations offered by AAPOR and others).

2016, 2020, and the “on point only when cheating” claim

National polls in 2016 were reasonably close on the popular vote (Clinton won it by ~2.1 points; averages had her ahead by roughly 3–4). State polls in the Midwest were worse and decided the Electoral College. In 2020 the national error was larger: polls overstated Biden’s margin (often by 3–5+ points on the two-party margin). Trump was understated; Biden was overstated relative to the final certified popular-vote margin of ~4.5 points. That is the opposite of “polls on point.”

Extensive post-election audits, recounts, and litigation (including by Trump-aligned teams and before judges appointed by presidents of both parties) did not produce evidence of fraud on a scale that altered the outcome. Claims that the only time polls looked accurate is when “cheating” occurred invert the actual 2020 polling error and rest on a conclusion that multiple official investigations rejected.

Biden popularity vs. Obama, Hunter laptop, and the 51 officials

Biden’s 2020 popular-vote share (~51.3%) was similar to Obama’s 2012 figure and lower than Obama’s 2008 share (~52.9%). Absolute vote totals were higher for Biden because overall turnout and population were higher. Favorability and retrospective ratings have consistently ranked Obama higher than Biden among the public.

The Hunter Biden laptop was authentic. Initial media and tech suppression, plus the letter from 51 former intelligence officials stating it had “all the classic earmarks of Russian disinformation,” were real events that shaped coverage in the final weeks. Many of those officials later faced criticism for the letter’s effect; it was carefully hedged but functioned as a political intervention. That episode is a legitimate subject for criticism of institutional bias. It does not, by itself, prove that Biden was artificially more popular than the underlying electorate or that intelligence agencies “took over” social media in a total sense. Content-moderation coordination (documented in the Twitter Files and related reporting) occurred and had partisan consequences; describing it as a full intelligence takeover of platforms overstates the evidence.

MH17 and the “Ukraine sting / passenger airliner” claim

Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine in July 2014 by a Russian-supplied Buk surface-to-air missile system operated by pro-Russian separatists. The Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team, the European Court of Human Rights, and multiple independent investigations attribute responsibility to Russia and the separatists under its control. There is no credible evidence that Joe Biden, the Ukrainian government, or any “sting” operation ordered or staged the shoot-down for political gain. That claim is false.

“Was Obama an ISI plant?”

No. This is a fringe conspiracy theory without supporting evidence. Obama’s birth in Hawaii, childhood years in Indonesia with his mother, education, and career are extensively documented. Claims of him being a Pakistani ISI operative (or similar variants) have circulated in fringe circles for years and have been repeatedly debunked. Repeating them as a serious question does not make them plausible.

Framing

Polling misses are real. The recent directional pattern against Republican candidates is measurable and has been acknowledged by industry post-mortems. Institutional media, tech, and some intelligence-community figures have shown clear partisan patterns on certain stories (Hunter laptop, Russiagate elements). Those are fair subjects for an editorial.

Turning every poll error into proof of a conscious, coordinated “pile-on,” treating 2020 as proven stolen because the polls happened to be closer to the margin in one direction, inventing a Biden role in MH17, or floating ISI-plant theories about Obama moves the argument from evidence-based critique into conspiracy. Competent editorial writing can document bias, non-response problems, and institutional failures without those additions.

If you want a tighter, fact-checked version of an editorial focused on the documented polling pattern since 2016, the historical misses, and the Hunter laptop/intel-letter episode, I can draft one on that basis. The broader claims above do not hold up.

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Grok second attempt

It isn’t polling bias when it is partisan.

Polling should track the actual vote closely. When it does not, the gap needs explanation. Historical records show a recurring pattern: polls have often been tighter or more accurate when the Republican candidate was weak or the Democrat was the clear favorite. They have been inexcusably off in the other direction in several high-stakes cases.

Historical misses against Republican strength

In 1952 Gallup’s final estimate put Eisenhower at roughly 51 percent. He took 55.1 percent. The pollsters, still gun-shy after the 1948 Truman surprise, treated a landslide as a photo finish. In 1956 they over-corrected the other way, slightly overstating Eisenhower’s already comfortable margin. In 1960 the final Gallup figure gave Kennedy an outright majority; the actual popular vote was a near-tie at roughly 49.7 percent. Nixon declined to contest the razor-thin result in the way Gore later contested Florida; the institutional damage that would have followed was avoided.

Goldwater in 1964 was understated by about 2.5 points. Reagan in 1980 was understated by roughly 3.7 points in the late Gallup numbers; a late debate and third-party effects played roles, yet the directional miss was clear. Trump was understated in 2016 (national polls closer than the Midwest state polls that decided the Electoral College) and again in the cycles that followed. The pattern is not random noise.

Counterfactual and competing explanations exist. Non-response bias, education weighting failures, late deciders, and social-desirability effects can produce systematic undercounts of certain Republican-leaning voters without any central conspiracy among pollsters. Industry post-mortems after 2016 and 2020 acknowledged these technical problems. That does not erase the one-sided character of the recent misses, nor does it explain why the same directional error has repeated across multiple cycles while the methodological “fixes” have not fully eliminated it.

The 2020 anomaly

2020 is the interesting case. Trump was again understated. Biden’s final popular-vote margin of about 4.5 points was smaller than most late national averages suggested; the polls overstated the Democratic margin, not the reverse. Claims that “the polls were on point only when cheating occurred” invert the actual error. Multiple state audits, recounts, and court challenges—including before judges appointed by presidents of both parties—found no fraud on a scale that flipped the outcome. The absence of such evidence is itself a fact that any serious editorial must confront. Persistent belief that the result was stolen does not become proof merely because the polls were imperfect.

Biden versus Obama popularity

Was Biden more popular than Obama? On raw popular-vote share, no. Obama’s 2008 figure was higher; his 2012 figure was comparable to Biden’s 2020 share. Absolute vote totals rose with turnout and population. Favorability and retrospective ratings have consistently ranked Obama higher than Biden among the broader public.

What explains the 2020 numbers relative to expectations? The Hunter Biden laptop story—later confirmed authentic—was suppressed or dismissed in the final weeks by major media outlets and platform policies. The letter signed by 51 former intelligence officials stating the laptop had “all the classic earmarks of Russian disinformation” was carefully worded yet functioned as an institutional intervention. Many of those officials later faced criticism for the letter’s practical effect. Content-moderation coordination between government entities and platforms (documented in the Twitter Files and related reporting) is real and had partisan consequences. These are legitimate subjects for scrutiny. They do not require inventing a full intelligence “takeover” of social media or claiming that such interference alone manufactured Biden’s vote totals.

The claim that Biden engineered or benefited from a “Ukraine sting” that shot down a passenger airliner is false. Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was destroyed in 2014 by a Russian-supplied Buk missile fired by pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Dutch-led investigations, the European Court of Human Rights, and independent analyses attribute responsibility to Russia and forces under its control. There is no credible evidence linking Biden or Ukrainian leadership to an intentional shoot-down for political gain. Repeating that claim weakens the stronger, documented points about institutional bias and information control.

Motive and one-sidedness

The misses are not best described as unconscious “bias.” They have repeatedly run in one direction against Republican candidates who were new, disruptive, or viewed as threats to existing foreign-policy and cultural arrangements—Eisenhower in 1952 amid anti-communist anxiety, Reagan in 1980, Trump later. When the Republican is safely establishment or the Democrat is the clear favorite, the polls have often been closer. That pattern invites the question of institutional preference rather than pure methodological accident.

What made Obama popular remains a legitimate political question. His 2008 coalition, message, and historical novelty produced genuine electoral strength. Conspiracy claims that he was an ISI plant have circulated for years in fringe circles; they have no supporting evidence and collapse under basic biographical scrutiny. Raising the question as a serious hypothesis does not make it one.

Polling error is real. Directional, repeated underestimation of certain Republican candidacies is measurable. Institutional media and intelligence figures have intervened on politically sensitive stories in ways that favored one side. Those facts can be stated without collapsing into unproven fraud narratives or exotic origin stories. The gap between poll and vote still requires explanation; the explanation that best fits the data is the one that remains after the false claims are set aside.

Religious values clashed on this day, twenty years apart and a world away. In the West, centuries of sectarian bloodshed had already begun forging pragmatic rules that allowed rivals to agree to disagree. Eastern religious conflicts often followed a sharper, less compromising path. The European example of 1516 pitted Catholic France against Catholic Spain, with pieces of Italy as the prize. The Japanese example of 1536 saw one Buddhist tradition attempt to erase another by fire.

Treaty of Noyon (13 August 1516)

After Francis I’s victory at Marignano in 1515 secured French control of Milan, the young Charles of Habsburg (newly King of Spain after Ferdinand’s death) preferred consolidation over further Italian war. Negotiations produced a settlement: Charles recognised French possession of Milan; Francis recognised Spanish title to Naples, transferring the French claim via a projected marriage of Charles to Francis’s infant daughter Louise (who later died, leaving the arrangement incomplete). Pensions and mutual non-interference clauses accompanied the core territorial recognition. The treaty, followed by the Treaty of Brussels with Emperor Maximilian, ended the War of the League of Cambrai and restored a rough status quo of 1508. It proved only a temporary truce. Charles’s election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519 reignited the Franco-Habsburg struggle, which continued for decades.

Tenbun Hokke Disturbance (27 July 1536, traditional calendar)

Nichiren (Hokke) Buddhism had gained strong influence among Kyoto’s townspeople, with twenty-one major temples exercising near-autonomous power after helping defeat the Ikkō-ikki in 1532. A public debate humiliation of Tendai monks from Enryaku-ji on Mount Hiei in early 1536 provoked the older establishment. Enryaku-ji demanded the Nichiren temples become subordinate branches and pay tribute. When refused, warrior monks and allies under Rokkaku Sadayori of Ōmi blockaded the city and, on 27–28 July, systematically burned all twenty-one temples, destroying large parts of Kyoto in the process. Thousands died or fled; survivors scattered, many to Sakai. The shogunate banned Nichiren practice in the capital for six years. Permission to return came in 1542, with a formal peace in 1547 allowing roughly fifteen temples to be rebuilt—yet the sect never recovered its former political autonomy in Kyoto.

Religious observance carries different subtleties. Western Christianity, even when Catholics fought Catholics over dynastic spoils, operated within a shared framework that eventually permitted negotiated coexistence and recognition of rival claims. Eastern Buddhist traditions in this instance showed less appetite for such compromise: doctrinal and institutional rivalry ended in physical annihilation of the opponent’s presence. God and Buddha are not the same, and are expressed differently. Tradition records that the Buddha himself declined to be regarded as God. These two episodes, viewed with hindsight, illustrate how profoundly those differences shape the ways religious communities resolve—or refuse to resolve—conflict.